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Little is known about how firms manage their cash policy over time. This paper fills this gap by 
examining if and how firms manage cash toward a target cash ratio. Estimating partial 
adjustment models of cash, we find that firms actively adjust their cash toward a target; however, 
adjustment is imperfect and there is large dispersion in the speed of adjustment across firms. We 
investigate the causes for this and find evidence consistent with the presence of adjustment costs. 
We also examine the implications of these results for previous interpretations of cross-sectional 
results through simulations of firms’ cash paths allowing for costly adjustment. The emerging 
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A large literature examines the cross-sectional determinants of cash. However, little is 
understood about how firms manage their cash because there is virtually no empirical work on 
the time-series dynamics of corporate cash management. This paper attempts to fill this gap by 
studying the speed of adjustment (SOA) of corporate cash toward its target, the properties and 
determinants of the SOA of cash, and the implications of the emerging dynamics for the 
interpretation of previous empirical findings in the cash literature. Our results are compelling and 
suggest that firms actively rebalance their cash holdings, yet imperfectly, consistent with the 
presence of adjustment costs. We further illustrate that there is substantial firm-level 
heterogeneity in the SOA of cash and examine what factors explain differences in firms’ SOA. 
We then investigate the importance of imperfect adjustment to the current interpretation of cross-
sectional results in the cash literature and find evidence that calls into question results consistent 
with the precautionary motive for holding cash. This paper is the first to examine adjustment 
costs of rebalancing cash and in doing so contributes not only to our understanding of the 
dynamics of cash but also to what is generally accepted as the primary driver of cash policy, 
namely the precautionary motive.  
We begin by examining the evolution of firms’ cash ratios over time.  To do this, firms 
are sorted on unexpected cash, relative to the empirical model of cash in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 
(2009), into four portfolios: Very high, High, Medium, and Low. Their unexpected cash 
positions are then tracked over the subsequent 20 years. This method is similar to the approach in 
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), applied to cash ratios instead of capital structure. Figure 1 
presents the results.  Two main patterns emerge: (i) Adjustment toward a target cash ratio is 
imperfect, and (ii) There is some persistence in cash ratios, albeit less than the documented 
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persistence in capital structure: In contrast to capital structure, the differences between the 
unexpected cash portfolios gradually become insignificant. However, it is clear that firms do not 
fully adjust in any one period and there is a substantial, unexplored transitory component of cash 
holdings that has been largely ignored by the existing literature on cash holdings.  The goal of 
this paper is to understand the causes and consequences of this imperfect adjustment to the target 
cash ratio. 
 To study the speed of adjustment of cash, we calculate the pooled annual speed of 
adjustment (SOA), i.e., the rate at which firms revert back to their target cash ratio. An SOA of 1 
implies perfect, continuous adjustment, whereas an SOA of 0 implies perfect non-readjustment. 
Because there is an ongoing debate in the literature about the proper estimation procedure of 
SOA1 (e.g., Iliev and Welch (2010)), we employ a wide battery of SOA estimators.2 We estimate 
the annual SOA of cash to lie between 0.2 and 0.4, suggesting that cash is imperfectly adjusted 
toward its target. To provide economic intuition, we translate these SOAs into half-lives, the 
time that it takes a firm to adjust one-half the distance to its target cash after a one unit shock to 
the error term. The half-life ranges from 1.4 to 3.1 years, which further highlights the imperfect 
adjustment of cash toward its target. 
 Theoretically, imperfect adjustment might be consistent with a "pecking order theory" of 
cash (or the "financial hierarchy hypothesis" of cash as referred to in Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson (1999)), under which firms have no optimal cash ratio, and therefore do not 
actively manage their cash. Alternatively,  it might still be consistent with a “trade-off theory” of 
cash, under which firms have an optimal cash level, if firms do rebalance their cash holdings, 
                                                 
1 While Iliev and Welch (2010) find that the estimates of the SOA of leverage are likely biased, they are less likely 
to be biased for cash ratios because unlike leverage, very few firms report zero cash ratios. In fact, only 1.9% of the 
observations in our sample correspond to zero cash holdings. 
2 These methods are discussed collectively in Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, 
Roberts, and Zender (2008), and Huang and Ritter (2009). 
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albeit infrequently, due to adjustment costs. To distinguish between these two alternatives, we 
investigate whether or not firms actively manage their cash balances. We find that financing, in 
the form of large net debt and equity issues, as well as stock repurchases, is associated with 
higher speeds of adjustments. We also show that large investments push firms towards their 
target cash ratio, suggesting that firms build cash reserves in anticipation of future, substantial 
investments. Taken together, these results suggest that firms actively manage their cash reserves. 
The natural question that arises is: Why do we observe imperfect readjustment? 
 To answer this question, we investigate whether adjustment costs impact the rebalancing 
of cash. We find that firms that are below their target exhibit significantly lower SOAs. This 
result is consistent with higher, asymmetric adjustment costs of building cash reserves relative to 
disgorging cash. We also find that firms that are further away from their target readjust cash 
holdings more rapidly, consistent with lower marginal adjustment costs (relative to the marginal 
benefits) when further away from the target. In addition, we examine how access to bank lines of 
credit impacts the SOA of cash.  If lines of credit provide lower cost of access to capital, we 
would expect firms with access to a line of credit to have higher SOAs. We find results 
consistent with this hypothesis; firms with access to bank lines of credit have significantly higher 
SOA of cash. 
 To further determine the impact of adjustment costs, we build on the insight in 
Faulkender et al. (2009) and seek out cross-sectional differences in adjustment costs related to 
free cash flows (FCF). We test whether firms with significantly negative or very high FCF have 
higher SOAs due to lower adjustment costs, relative to those around the median free cash flow. 
Those with significantly negative free cash flow should have low adjustment costs because they 
must raise external capital or use cash to cover their financing deficit, and thus the adjustment 
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cost becomes a sunk cost. Symmetrically, firms with large positive free cash flows are most 
likely to be distributing excess capital or retain cash to move toward their target cash. Our results 
indeed reveal a U-Shape relation between the SOA of cash and FCF: SOA is significantly higher 
for firms with low/high FCF. We therefore conclude that adjustment costs are an important 
determinant of how a firm manages its cash balances. 
 In addition to examining how adjustment costs impact SOA, we also examine other 
variables that are important to cash policy. We find that there is substantial cross-sectional 
dispersion in the SOA of cash across firms and investigate its determinants. Our findings suggest 
that better governance is associated with more rapid SOA, implying that cash rebalancing is 
efficient. Surprisingly, we do not find any evidence that links between the SOA of capital 
structure and the SOA of cash. This suggests that rapid rebalancing of leverage does not entail 
rapid readjustment of cash. It also implies that there is no simple relation between the impact of 
adjustment costs on the rebalancing of leverage and cash, thus highlighting the importance of 
cash policy. 
 In a final step, we examine the implications of costly adjustment for previous findings in 
the cash literature. As shown in the capital structure literature (e.g., Leary and Roberts (2005), 
Strebulaev (2007)), the presence of adjustment costs might hamper the interpretation of some of 
the conclusions drawn based from cross-sectional patterns. To investigate this idea, we simulate 
corporate cash paths allowing for costly adjustment. In the simulation, all firms are endowed 
with the same level of target cash. We then let their cash holdings mechanically fluctuate with 
random draws of cash flows and capital expenditures, unless they hit the cash lower or upper 
bounds, in which case they revert to their target. We vary the interval between the lower and 
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upper bound to test the implications of lower adjustment costs (smaller intervals) versus higher 
adjustment costs (larger intervals).3 
 We conjecture that firms with larger cash flow shocks will hold more cash in the 
presence of costly adjustment because firms will take longer to rebalance cash back to its target 
given the adjustment costs. Similarly, firms with larger capital expenditure shocks will hold less 
cash in the presence of costly adjustment. Since larger shocks to cash flow (capital expenditures) 
will cause higher volatility in cash flow (capital expenditures), a mechanical relation between 
volatility in cash flow/capital expenditure and cash holdings will exist that would not exist 
without adjustment costs. We find evidence consistent with our hypotheses: The relation 
between cash holdings and cash flow/capital expenditure volatility increases dramatically when 
adjustment costs increase. However, this relation is not economically meaningful. All simulated 
cash paths correspond to the same target cash level, regardless of cash flow/capital expenditure 
volatility. Thus, these findings cast doubt on the standard interpretation of the empirically 
observed relation between cash and volatility and suggest that we might need to rethink our tests 
of cash holdings in the presence of costly adjustment. Given that volatility is the primary driver 
of the aggregate increase in cash, documented by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), this result is 
particularly interesting. 
 Our paper adds to prior literature in a number of important ways. First, it argues that the 
dynamic, time-series dimension of cash management should not be overlooked in favor of cross-
sectional tests, which have been the focus of the previous literature (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson (1999), Almeida, Campbello, and Weisbach (2004), Faulkender and Wang 
(2006)). Second, it suggests that costly adjustment plays an important role in liquidity policies. 
                                                 
3 To account for the asymmetrically higher adjustment costs below the target cash, we also consider a specification 
of skewed adjustment bounds, in which the high bound is asymmetrically closer to the target relative to the low 
bound. This specification yields similar results. 
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The role of adjustment costs has been emphasized in the context of other financial policies, such 
as capital structure4 and investment (e.g., Leary and Roberts (2005), Strebulaev (2007), Zhang 
(2005)), but has not received attention in the cash literature. Finally, this paper shows that costly 
adjustment has implications for how we interpret standard results in the cash literature and calls 
into question some of the empirical findings in previous studies.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the data and examines the properties 
of the rebalancing of cash holdings. Section II investigates whether firms actively rebalance their 
cash holdings. Section III explores the presence of adjustment costs, while Section IV studies the 
cross-sectional determinants of SOA. Section V studies the implications of costly adjustment 
through simulations, and Section VI concludes. 
 
I. Rebalancing of Cash Holdings 
A. Data 
Our sample consists of annual data on publicly traded firms available on Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat. The sample period starts in 1965 and ends in 2006, before the beginning of the 2007 
credit crisis. We stop before the beginning of the crisis because recent evidence suggests that 
cash reserves played an important role in firms' operating performance during the crisis, and thus 
including this period may alter our results (Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2009)). 
 We exclude financial firms and utilities, defined as firms with SIC codes between 6000-
6999 and 4900-4949, respectively. For the relatively few firms that change their fiscal year 
during our sample period, we keep the most recent fiscal year convention. Because our analysis 
relies on the estimation of cash rebalancing over the sample period, we restrict attention to firms 
                                                 
4 There are alternative explanations for the slow SOA of leverage that do not rely on adjustment costs. For example, 
the slow SOA in DeAngelo et al. (2010) is a result of intentional deviations from the target as a response to shocks 
to investment opportunities. 
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with available data on cash and short-term investments for at least 15 years.5 Our final sample 
consists of 106,091 annual observations for 4,285 firms.  
 Variables are defined in Appendix 1. We winsorize all variables, except Tobin’s Q, at the 
1st and 99th percentiles to lessen the influence of outliers. Tobin’s Q is computed as in Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997) with an upper bound of 10, following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003). 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables employed in this study. Average 
cash flow is 8.0% of book assets, whereas average capital expenditures are 7.2% of book assets. 
In both cases, the cross-sectional variation suggests there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity 
across firms. Also, the average firm has outstanding short-term (long-term) debt of 6.0% (20.0%) 
of book assets, a cash flow volatility of 4.9%, and Tobin’s Q that is greater than one. 
 
B. The Speed of Adjustment of Cash 
We begin by examining the evolution of firms’ cash ratios over time.  To do this, we sort firms 
on unexpected cash, relative to the empirical model of cash in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), 
into four portfolios: Very high, High, Medium, and Low. We then track their unexpected cash 
positions over the subsequent 20 years. This method is similar to the approach in Lemmon, 
Roberts, and Zender (2008), applied to cash ratios instead of capital structure. Figure 1 presents 
the results.   
Figure 1 suggests that there is significant convergence among the four portfolios' cash 
averages over time. After 16 years, the differences between the unexpected cash portfolios 
become insignificant. Yet, convergence is slow and a significant portion of it occurs in the first 
few years after the formation period, as evidenced by the flattening slope over time in the Low 
and Very High portfolios. Therefore, a preliminary examination of cash ratios suggests that the 
                                                 
5 We obtain similar results if we remove this restriction and include firms with fewer than 15 observations.  
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previously identified cross-sectional determinants of cash, used by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 
(2009) and others, explain the heterogeneity of cash ratios across firms. Nevertheless, Figure 1 
suggests the presence of a transitory or short run component in cash ratios. This component 
receives virtually no attention in previous studies of firms' cash policies and is the focus of this 
paper. Thus, we start our empirical investigation by estimating the pooled speed of adjustment 
(SOA) of the firms in our sample. 
 To calculate the SOA of cash ratios, we estimate a target adjustment model, in which 
cash adjusts over time to a target. This section offers a comprehensive treatment of the target 
adjustment properties of cash. We consider various measures of cash and different target 
adjustment estimation procedures, building on the voluminous body of research on capital 
structure rebalancing. 
 Table 2 presents the properties of the cash measures used in our paper, and the Appendix 
summarizes the definitions of each variable. The primary measure we use is cash divided by 
book assets. Table 2 shows that the cash-to-assets ratio has a pooled mean of 10.4%, a pooled 
standard deviation of 13.3%, and an average cross-sectional standard deviation of 12.5%. The 
median is at 5.5%, suggesting that the distribution of cash is right-skewed. We consider two 
alternative measures. The most common alternative measure is the cash-to-net-book-assets ratio, 
where net book assets are defined as book assets excluding cash. Table 2 shows that it has a 
pooled mean of 17.0%, a pooled median of 5.8%, a pooled standard deviation of 43.8%, and an 
average cross-sectional standard deviation of 38.5%. This suggests that the cash-to-net-assets 
ratio is also skewed to the right.  Another possibility is to normalize cash by market, instead of 
book, values. As Table 2 shows, cash-to-market value has a lower pooled mean (7.8%) and 
lower pooled and cross-sectional standard deviations (9.6% and 9.0%, respectively). Based on 
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the median of 4.6%, this measure is also skewed to the right. Table 2 also considers dollar cash 
reserves directly. It shows that the pooled mean cash reserve is $105.7 million, the pooled 
median is $9.6 million, the pooled standard deviation is $339.0 million, and the average cross-
sectional standard deviation is $286.8 million. Thus, cash amounts are also heavily skewed to the 
right.6 
 Next, we describe the different methods used to investigate cash target adjustment. Tests 
of capital structure target behavior go back to Taggart (1977) and Auerbach (1985).7 In their 
general form, applied to cash, these models are given by: 
   ·            (1) 
 where the target-adjustment coefficient  is greater than zero if firms adjust toward the target, 
and it is strictly less than one if adjustment is imperfect.   and  denote, respectively, 
the cash ratio and the target ratio at t. The expression  is called the “deviation 
from the target.”  Rearranging Eq. (1) yields: 
   1 · ·            (2) 
 We consider four different estimators of the speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash ratios. 
The first, which we call OLS, is a pooled OLS regression.  In this estimate, cash is regressed on 
past cash and a set of control variables similar to the ones employed in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 
(2009), which include lagged cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital 
expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital (excluding cash), R&D 
expenditures, and acquisitions: 
   1 ·           (3) 
                                                 
6 Table 2 also presents summary statistics on measures of cash relative to the target, which we explain and discuss in 
Section III. 
7 More recent examples include Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Welch (2004), and Chang and Dasgupta (2009). 
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where  is the vector of control variables. This procedure resembles the procedure to 
estimate target capital structure in Fama and French (2002) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 
(2008).8  
 Flannery and Rangan (2006) suggest adding fixed effects into the estimator to control for 
omitted variables that might drive the heterogeneity across firms’ targets. We call this model FE, 
and estimate it as follows: 
   1 ·           (4) 
 However, one potential problem with the FE estimator is that the fixed effects consume a 
large number of degrees of freedom. As discussed in Huang and Ritter (2009) and Iliev and 
Welch (2010), the loss of degrees of freedom may lead to the 'Hurwicz bias', implying mean-
reversion even when there is not one. This bias arises in small samples, with few firms and time 
periods, where the lagged residuals and the independent variables are not orthogonal. In our 
context, a large error term in period t will create a large independent variable in period t+1, thus 
violating the orthogonality assumption. While this bias is not important for the OLS estimator 
(Eq. (3)) because our sample is large, with many more firms than time periods, it reappears with 
the FE estimator (Eq. (4)) because the intercepts assume the mean error realizations. One 
possible solution is to use the GMM procedure in Blundell and Bond (1998), as implemented by 
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008). Table 3 reports this estimator in the GMM column.9  
 Huang and Ritter (2009) also compute a Long-Differencing (LD) estimator, proposed by 
Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007) for dynamic panels with highly persistent data series. 
                                                 
8 We also have estimated Eq. (3) in differences instead of levels and obtained similar results. 
9 An econometric derivation of the GMM estimator is beyond the scope of our paper. Intuitively, the moment 
conditions are derived based on the argument that firms-specific residuals, 1 ·  , are 
uncorrelated with lagged cash. 
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This estimator is estimated from the following equation using iterated two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) with lagged residuals as instruments: 
  , , 1 ·                     (5) 
The LD estimator requires a long time-series and can be estimated with different length periods. 
As can be seen from Eq. (5), we focus our attention to overlapping 7 years, but the results are 
similar if we use other time lengths. 
 Following Faulkender et al. (2010), we also consider a modified adjustment model that 
focuses on active rebalancing. This specification attempts to correct for passive changes in the 
cash ratio that are simply due to the company posting its annual income to its equity account. 
Thus, instead of normalizing lagged cash by lagged book asset, it is normalized by the sum of 
lagged book assets and contemporaneous net income. The OLS model in Eq. (3), for example, 
becomes: 
   1 ·         (3a) 
where: . We change the estimators in Eq. (4) and (5), in a similar fashion to 
Eq. (3a), and call this measure Active cash/book assets.  
 The estimators in Eq. (3), (4), (5) have been collectively criticized and shown to generate 
biased estimates of the SOA of leverage in Iliev and Welch (2010). Yet, these estimators are 
considerably less likely to be biased in the context of the SOA of cash because very few firms in 
our sample report zero cash holdings. In fact, only 1.9% of the observations in our sample 
correspond to zero cash ratios. Furthermore, most of our subsequent analysis concentrates on the 
cross section of firms’ SOA, which is unlikely to be affected by biases in the SOA estimators, as 
long as these biases are not systematically related to the cross-sectional determinants of SOA.  
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 Table 3 reports the results of the different estimators in our sample using each of the cash 
measures. The table reports  from Eq. (3), (4), and (5).  The variable  is equal to one minus the 
influence of past cash, which is simply one minus the coefficient on lagged cash. This coefficient 
can be interpreted as the SOA or the rate of adjustment to the target.   
 The main take away from Table 3 is that the speed of cash adjustment is imperfect. The 
OLS model results suggest that the SOA of cash lies between 0.220 and 0.248, depending on the 
measure of cash being used. SOA is slightly higher when estimated with the FE model, and lies 
between 0.393 and 0.431, again depending on the measures of cash being used. Similarly, the 
GMM estimators lie between 0.353 and 0.433, whereas the LD estimators lie between 0.338 and 
0.356. Thus, we conclude that regardless of the estimation procedures and measures of cash, the 
readjustment of cash ratios is imperfect. Further, even after correcting for passive changes in the 
cash ratio that are simply due to the company posting its annual income to its equity account, the 
SOA remains virtually unchanged. These results are different from the results in Faulkender et 
al. (2010), where the SOA of leverage doubles after correcting for passive changes. 
    One way to gain intuition into the meaning of these SOA estimates is to translate them 
into “half-lives.” The SOA is the expected percentage by which the gap between the past cash 
and the target closes in one period. Half-life is the time that it takes a firm to adjust one-half the 
distance to its target cash after a one-unit shock to the error term. For an AR(1) process, half-life 
is log(0.5)/log(1-SOA). Thus, focusing on cash as fraction of book assets, the OLS estimate 
indicates a half-life of 2.8 years, whereas the GMM estimator indicates a half-life of 1.6 years.  
 Our results clearly suggest less than perfect and continuous adjustment to the target. 
These results can occur for three reasons: 1) Firms do not have a target cash ratio and therefore 
do not manage their cash holdings toward it; 2) Firms have a target cash ratio but the target 
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model is misspecified; or 3) Firms have a target cash ratio and they do manage cash toward the 
target, but there are costs to adjust their cash ratios. These costs may arise due to the cost of 
raising cash through financing or due to the cost of distributing cash through a dividend or stock 
repurchase.  
These three conflicting views have very different implications. If firms do not have a target 
cash ratio, we would not expect them to actively manage their cash ratios toward their targets 
through financing activities, investment policies, and distributions to shareholders. If firms do 
have target cash ratios, but they slowly adjust their cash toward the target due to the presence of 
adjustment costs, we would expect the speed of adjustment to vary across firms based on the 
adjustment costs they face. Finally, if the model for target cash levels is misspecified, we would 
not expect firms to rebalance or converge to that target even slowly. Nevertheless, the evidence 
presented in Figure 1 suggests that firms do rebalance toward the target cash ratios implied by 
the empirical model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). In fact, the differences between our Low 
and Very High unexpected cash portfolios disappear completely in 16 years. Thus, we devote the 
next two sections to the investigation of active cash management (Section II) and adjustment 
costs (Section III). 
 
II. Active Management of Cash 
The results in Table 3 suggest that the rebalancing of cash ratios is imperfect, possibly because 
firms actively but slowly manage their cash ratios to maintain a target level of cash. Another 
alternative is that firms do not actively manage their cash holdings toward a target and that one 
should not necessarily equate mean-reversion with active cash management.  
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To distinguish between these two possibilities, we start by examining the relation 
between the SOA of cash ratios and the underlying dynamics of actual cash ratios vis-à-vis the 
dynamics of the implied target cash ratio. Specifically, we estimate the firm's unexpected cash 
ratio at time t as the residual from the target cash ratio implied by Eq. (3) over a five-year rolling 
window [t-5,t-1] and denote it by . Then, we examine if changes in unexpected cash from 
time t-1 to time t are due to (passive) changes in the implied target or (active) changes in actual 
cash. Denoting the target cash ratio by , the change in unexpected cash can be written as: 
                (6a) 
Rearranging Eq. (6a) yields:   
                (6b) 
Using Eq. (6b), we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if more than 50% of the change in 
unexpected cash from year t-1 to t is due to the change in cash and equal to 0 if 50% or more of 
the change is due to the change in the target cash ratio. We refer to this variable as Active, 
defined formally as:   
                               (6c) 
The summary statistics for Active are given in Table 2. They indicate that changes in unexpected 
cash are due to changes in cash rather than changes in the target in 55.4% of the observations. 
This indicates that firms experience dramatic changes in both their target cash ratios and their 
actual cash ratios.  
 Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of estimating the OLS pooled SOA of cash ratios in 
subsamples sorted on Active.10 Our conjecture is that if companies actively manage their cash 
holdings, the SOA of cash should be significantly higher when Active=1. The evidence presented 
                                                 
10 Here, as well as in subsequent tables, we obtained similar results with the other 3 estimators of SOA (FE ,GMM, 
LD). For brevity, we focus our attention on the OLS estimates.  
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in Panel A is consistent with our conjecture. For all three measures of cash ratios, the SOA of 
cash is significantly higher when Active=1, that is, when most of the change in unexpected cash 
is due to changes in actual cash rather than in the implied target cash ratio. Thus, the preliminary 
evidence suggests that changes in cash, rather than in implied target ratios, lead to substantially 
faster rebalancing of cash, consistent with firms actively changing their actual cash ratios 
towards a target. 
 In the remainder of this section, we consider three channels through which firms might 
actively manage their cash ratios to maintain a target ratio. In Panel B of Table 4, we examine 
the correlation between investment, as measured by scaled capital expenditure, and the SOA of 
cash ratios. Each year t, we divide the sample into below-median and above-median capital 
expenditures, and estimate the SOA of cash from year t-1 to t. If firms actively manage their cash 
ratios toward a target and adjust their cash reserves to accommodate future investment needs, we 
would observe more rapid cash rebalancing once investments materialize. The evidence in Panel 
B suggests that this is indeed the case. The SOA of cash is significantly higher when firms make 
substantial investments. For instance, the SOA coefficient on our cash-to-assets ratio is 0.23 
when firms do not make significant investments and is 0.31 when they do make such investment 
(i.e., an increase of 35% in SOA). As panel B shows, the results are similar for the two other 
measures of cash ratios.  
 Another way of managing cash ratios is issuing debt and equity to raise capital. If firms 
were actively managing cash, they would do so when their cash ratios lie below the target. 
Alternatively, if they were not actively managing their cash ratios, they would issue debt and 
equity regardless of whether they are below or above their target cash level. To examine these 
alternatives, we divide our sample into firms that made and did not make significant net debt and 
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equity issues (defined as issues with values of at least 5% of book assets, see the Appendix for 
variable definitions) each year t, and compare the SOA of cash across these two groups from 
year t-1 to year t. These results are given in Panel C of Table 4. As Panel C clearly shows, the 
SOA of large net debt and equity issuers is significantly higher compared to that of non-issuers. 
For example, the SOA of cash/book assets is 0.20 for non-issuers and 0.33 issuers (i.e., an 
increase of 65% in SOA). As can be seen from Panel C, we obtain similar results when we scale 
cash by net book assets or the market value of assets. 
 The firm can also actively manage its cash ratios by distributing cash to shareholders if 
its cash ratio is above the target. Given that dividends are relatively smooth over time, we focus 
our attention on share repurchases, which have become increasingly important in the last two 
decades as the primary payout method. We examine the stock repurchasing activity of firms in 
the four unexpected cash portfolios described earlier. The results are presented in Figure 2.11 We 
find that the tendency to repurchase shares noticeably differs across the portfolios. The 
propensity to repurchase shares is monotonically positively related to firms' unexpected cash 
ratios. This tendency is stronger in earlier years, consistent with Figure 1, which shows that 
much of the convergence in cash ratios is achieved during the first few years, but does persist in 
later years as well. This finding suggests that firms might be using share repurchase policy to 
rebalance their cash holdings.12 This result is consistent with the evidence in Brav et al. (2005), 
who find that stock repurchases are made out of residual cash flows after investment. It also 
helps identify the mechanism behind the initial convergence of cash ratios observed in Figure 1. 
                                                 
11 We detrend stock repurchases by first regressing them on year dummies to get rid of the secular upward trend in 
share repurchase activity in our sample period. 
12 As stock repurchases became more common after 1984, we repeat the analysis excluding observations prior to 
1984 and obtain similar results. 
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 Finally, Figure 3 attempts to track the relation between cash balances and companies’ 
inflows and outflows, as reported in their statements of cash flows. It sorts firms on the level of 
their previous year’s cash ratios around the median, and compares subsequent year changes in 
cash, debt issues, stock repurchases, dividend payments, capital expenditure, and acquisitions. 
Firms with beginning-of-year low cash ratios tend to increase their cash during the year. They 
issue debt and tend to engage in less stock repurchases and dividend payments. Interestingly, 
their capital expenditure and acquisition activity is only lightly affected by their cash balances. 
This evidence is broadly consistent with the pecking order theory, and suggests that companies 
attempt to increase their cash levels if they start with low cash reserves and to finance their 
activities by issuing debt. Due to the upward trend in cash holdings over our sample period, even 
companies with high beginning-of-year cash tend to increase their cash reserves. 
 Overall, the findings in this section present evidence consistent with active cash 
management toward a target ratio. Thus, it suggests that the imperfect rebalancing of cash ratios 
found in section II is not due to firms not having target cash ratios and therefore not managing 
their cash toward a target. These results are supportive of the “trade-off theory” of cash, under 
which firms have an optimal cash level, as opposed to the "financial hierarchy hypothesis" of 
cash (as referred to in Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999)) where firms have not 
optimal cash ratio.  In the next section, we consider another possible explanation for the 
imperfect rebalancing of cash ratios that is consistent with active cash management toward a 






III. Adjustment Costs 
The results in the previous section suggest that firms actively manage their cash policies toward 
a target cash ratio. However, our pooled estimates of the speed of adjustment of cash suggest that 
cash rebalancing is imperfect. Thus, a natural question that arises is why cash readjustment is 
imperfect. In other words, what prevents firms from continuously and perfectly adjusting their 
cash ratios toward their target? One possible explanation, suggested by Leary and Roberts 
(2005), Strebulaev (2007), and others in the context of leverage rebalancing, is the presence of 
adjustment costs. Facing adjustment costs, firms might find it optimal to rebalance their cash 
holdings only infrequently. This, in turn, will yield imperfect, non-continuous readjustment of 
cash ratios, which is consistent with active readjustment of cash, albeit only at "readjustment 
points." The purpose of this section is to test the hypothesis that adjustment costs affect the speed 
of adjustment of cash ratios.  
We create two variables to explore the effect of the firm's unexpected cash on its 
rebalancing activity. The first variable, denoted Positive Xcash, is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the company's unexpected cash is positive, that is, if its actual cash ratio lies above its 
implied target, as calculated from the empirical cash model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). 
Formally, Positive Xcash is defined as: 
     0                                                      (7) 
The purpose of this variable is to test whether the SOA of cash is different when firms' cash 
ratios are above vs. below the target. The adjustment costs hypothesis would imply that SOA is 
asymmetrically lower below the target, as adjustment costs are higher below the target cash ratio 
due to financing constraints and the costs of external financing.  
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Second, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the absolute difference between the 
firm’s cash ratio and its implied target ratio is greater than the sample-wide median in each year 
t, and zero otherwise. We refer to this variable as Away from target. Formally, this variable is 
defined as: 
        (8) 
This variable is designed to test whether firms that are further away from their target tend to 
rebalance their cash ratios more rapidly. Such a finding would be consistent with the presence of 
fixed adjustment costs, which would make it optimal to rebalance only when sufficiently far 
away from the target, when the costs of being away from the target are high enough. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics of these variables and Panel B of Table 2 
presents the correlations between the various measures. The summary statistics for Positive 
Unexpected Cash indicate that approximately 60% of the observations correspond to cash ratios 
that lie below the target. The vast majority of the literature on corporate liquidity focuses on 
positive unexpected cash in the context of agency concerns. Little is known about the 
implications of holding less cash than the target, and this paper is therefore one of the first to 
distinguish firms based on having negative unexpected cash. Table 2 also shows that the average 
absolute unexpected cash, that is, the average absolute deviation from the target ratio, is 7.3% of 
book assets. Given that the mean cash ratio in our sample is 10.4%, the average deviation is 
large.  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of estimating OLS pooled SOAs of cash ratios 
separately for firms with positive unexpected cash and negative unexpected cash. The results 
suggest that cash rebalancing is faster when firms' cash ratios are above their implied target 
ratios. The difference persists across all three measures of cash ratios and is of substantial 
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magnitudes. This finding is consistent with the presence of asymmetrically higher adjustment 
costs when firms are below their target ratio, consistent with the presence of financing frictions 
and constraints.13 In Panel B, we estimate cash SOA separately when the absolute difference 
between actual cash ratios and implied target ratios lie below and above the median. Again, 
consistent with the presence of fixed adjustment costs, we find that the SOA of cash is 
substantially higher when further away from the target across all three measures of cash ratios.  
We also examine whether access to a bank line of credit impacts the SOA of cash.  One 
hypothesis is that a bank line of credit implies lower financing constraints and therefore lower 
adjustment costs of cash and a higher SOA. This hypothesis is examined in the context of the 
rebalancing of capital structure by Lockhart (2009), who finds that credit lines are associated 
with a significantly higher SOA of leverage. Alternatively, firms with access to a line of credit 
may care less about their cash holdings because they have access to an alternative source of 
liquidity. This implies that the SOA of cash for such firms would be lower due to the 
substitutability of cash and credit lines. 
 To test the relation between the SOA of cash and bank lines of credit, we collect data on 
revolving credit facilities from DealScan. For each firm-year in our sample, we document 
whether the firm had access to a revolving credit facility that year and code a binary variable that 
equals 0 if the firm did not have access to a line of credit that year, and 1 if it did have access.14 
Then we estimate the SOA of cash separately when this variable equals 0 and when it equals 1. 
Panel C of Table 5 reports these results. Across all three measures of cash ratios, access 
to a line of credit is associated with a more rapid SOA of cash. For example, the SOA of cash-to-
                                                 
13 Furthermore, in unreported results, we find that the SOA of cash is even lower during recessions, when the costs 
of accessing external capital markets are even higher. In fact, the slowest SOA corresponds to firms that enter 
economic downturns with negative excess cash. Note, however, that the target cash ratio itself might be affected by 
the business cycle (e.g., Gryglewicz (2008)). 
14The cross-sectional relation between bank lines of credit and cash was first studied in Sufi (2009). 
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assets ratios without access to a line of credit is 0.26, whereas the SOA with access to a line of 
credit is 0.32. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that access to a bank line of credit 
implies lower financing constraints and therefore lower adjustment costs of cash, which make it 
optimal for the firm to rebalance its cash holdings more rapidly. Taken together, the results in 
Table 5 are consistent with the presence of asymmetric, fixed adjustment costs that cause firms 
to optimally rebalance cash ratios infrequently. 
To further explore whether there is evidence consistent with the presence of adjustment 
costs, we build on the insight in Faulkender et al. (2009) and try to find cross-sectional 
differences in adjustment costs. We identify firms with large (positive or negative) free cash 
flows, which are likely to confront a relatively low marginal cost of adjustment and, hence, 
should manifest relatively rapid adjustment speeds. Specifically, we hypothesize that firms with 
significantly negative free cash flows should have low adjustment costs because they must raise 
external capital or use cash to cover their financing deficit and thus the adjustment cost is a sunk 
cost. Symmetrically, firms with large positive free cash flows are most likely to be distributing 
excess capital or retain cash to move toward their target cash. Paying dividends or repurchasing 
shares will decrease cash, while retaining free cash flow will increase cash. On the other hand, 
firms with free cash flows close to zero will confront the largest incremental costs. We therefore 
would expect that when we estimate the SOA separately across these three groups, we would 
find higher adjustment speeds for those firms whose incremental adjustment costs are lower.  
Table 6 presents the results of estimating the speed of adjustment of cash ratios across 
three subsamples sorted on free cash flow (FCF): (i) the top 15% sample-wide of FCF, (ii) the 
bottom 15% sample-wide of FCF, and (iii) the medium 70% sample-wide of FCF. Our 
adjustment costs hypothesis suggests that the SOA of cash would be more rapid in the top and 
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bottom 15%, where incremental adjustment costs are lower, relative to the SOA when FCF is 
particularly low or high. 
Consistent with the adjustment costs hypothesis, the results in Table 6 reveal a U-Shape 
relation between the SOA of cash ratios and free cash flows across all three measures of cash 
ratios. SOA is significantly higher for firms with low/high FCF relative to medium FCF. 
Consider, for example, the cash-to-assets ratio in Panel A. The estimated SOA is 0.27 when FCF 
is high, 0.23 when FCF is low, and 0.19 for medium level of FCF. Thus, we conclude that firms 
tend to rebalance cash ratios more rapidly when free cash flows are particularly low or high and, 
therefore, the incremental costs of rebalancing through cash flow retention, payout, or external 
capital-raising are particularly low. 
Taken together, the results in this section are consistent with the presence of adjustment 
costs in the management of cash policies towards target ratios. These findings are consistent with 
our previous findings that companies actively manage their cash ratios toward a target, albeit 
imperfectly. In the next section, we further investigate the cross-section of cash SOA, focusing 
on the relation between cash and two corporate dimensions that received significant attention in 
the cash literature, namely corporate governance and leverage. 
 
IV. Cross-sectional Differences in Cash Rebalancing 
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the SOA of cash across firms, where the SOA is estimated 
by firm, with the mass concentrated in the lower half of the distribution.15 As evidenced in this 
figure, there is substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the speed of adjustment of cash across 
firms. In this section, we examine factors that explain the cross section of SOA and test whether 
                                                 
15 Note that estimating the SOA by firm reintroduces the Hurwicz bias and therefore biases the SOA estimates 




corporate governance and leverage, two areas that were studied extensively in the context of cash 
holdings (e.g., Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007), Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007), and 
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008)), relate systematically to the cross-sectional variation in 
SOA.  In doing so, we add to the previous literature that mainly considered the connection 
between the level and value of corporate cash holdings and corporate governance and leverage.  
Specifically, we ask whether better-governed firms, which have been shown to waste less 
cash than poorly governed firms, also rebalance their cash ratio more rapidly toward their target 
level. While interesting in itself, this approach also has the advantage of allowing cash to be 
above or below the target, whereas previous studies have largely concentrated on the relation 
between positive "excess" cash, or having too much cash, and corporate governance.16  To test 
the relation between corporate governance and the SOA of cash, we use multiple measures of 
internal and external corporate governance including the degree of managerial entrenchment due 
to takeover defenses and the presence of large shareholder monitoring. These governance 
measures are collectively examined in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Cremers and Nair 
(2005), who show that governance has a positive impact on firm value. Our first measure is the 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index, which measures the number of 
anti-takeover provisions in a firm’s charter and in the legal code of the state in which the firm is 
incorporated. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick establish that more anti-takeover provisions are an 
indication of poor corporate governance. We also employ two measures of large shareholder 
monitoring. One measure is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors and the other 
is the sum of all ownership positions greater than 5% held by institutional investors. For each 
measure, we divide the sample at the median and designate the corresponding halves as poor 
                                                 
16 One exception is Nikolov and Whited (2009), who estimate a structural model of investment and cash holdings in 




governance and good governance. Then, we estimate the SOA of cash separately in each 
subsample. 
 Table 7 gives the results of our corporate governance tests, with each panel 
corresponding to a different governance measure. Using cash scaled by either assets or market 
values and across all three measures of governance, we find that the SOA is more rapid in well-
governed firms compared to poorly governed firms.  These results suggest that well-governed 
firms not only waste less cash, but also rebalance their cash holdings toward their target more 
rapidly.  However, magnitudes of the differences are not always significant. For example, the 
SOA of cash-to-assets for poorly governed firms is 0.20 when governance is measured by the g-
index, 0.23 when it is measured by the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, and 
0.23 when it is measured by the number of large block holders. The SOA for well-governed 
firms, however, is 0.24 when governance is measured by the g-index, 0.28 when it is measured 
by the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, and 0.28 when it is measured by the 
number of large block holders.   Further, when we scale by net assets poorly governed firms have 
a higher SOA. Thus, though taken together the results suggest that well-governed firms 
rebalance more quickly than poorly governed firms, the differences are not dramatic. 
 Next, we investigate the relation between the management of capital structure and the 
management of cash holdings. The "negative debt" view of cash suggests that since cash 
balances are readily available to redeem debt, they should not be viewed as independent of 
leverage but rather “negative debt.” Under this view, firms should be managing their cash and 
debt positions together, i.e., managing their net debt positions. This view would imply that the 
rebalancing of cash and debt is highly correlated and thus we would expect the SOA of cash to 
be highly correlated with the SOA of debt. An alternative view, put forth by Opler et al. (1999) 
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and more recently by Acharya et al. (2007), suggests that in the presence of financing frictions, 
cash plays a separate role and should therefore be managed and studied in its own right. Under 
this view, the rebalancing (SOA) of cash and debt should not necessarily be highly correlated, 
since firms will be managing their capital structure and cash policies separately. As Opler et al. 
(1999) point out, however, the cross-sectional determinants of cash and debt are very similar, 
only with opposite signs and possibly different magnitudes. Previous literature did not consider, 
however, the relation between the dynamic rebalancing of the two, which might shed further 
light on the interaction between the two policies. 
 In Table 8, we test the relation between the SOA of cash ratios and the SOA of leverage 
ratios. The SOA of debt is estimated by firm from an autoregressive OLS procedure similar to 
the one in Figure 4, using the set of control variables in Byoun (2008), which includes industry 
median debt, the marginal tax rate, Q, operating income, depreciation and amortization, a 
dividend dummy, size, fixed assets, R&D expenses, and Altman's Z-score. We then divide the 
sample into two groups, consisting of firms with an SOA of debt below and above the median 
debt SOA, respectively, and estimate the SOA of cash ratios separately in each subsample.  
 The results in Table 8 reveal no significant relation between the SOA of cash and the 
SOA of leverage. Across all three measures of cash ratios, the difference between the SOA of 
cash for the two subsamples is negligible. For example, the SOA of cash-to-assets is 0.258 for 
firms with low SOA of debt, and 0.254 for firms with high SOA of debt. Thus, not only is the 
difference small, the SOA is actually higher for firms with slower SOA of debt. Additionally, the 
direction of the differences is not consistent across the three cash measures, with the relation 
using the cash-to-net-assets and the cash-to-market-assets ratios being opposite of the relation 
using cash-to-assets. These results suggest that cash management is not simply an artifact of 
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capital structure management since the dynamic rebalancing of cash does not coincide with that 
of leverage. 
 
V. Implications of Costly Adjustment 
So far, we have shown that the slow speed of adjustment of cash ratios is consistent with costly 
adjustment, thus implying that firms rebalance their cash ratios only infrequently. Further, we 
have shown that there are systematic differences across firms in their speed of adjustment. These 
systematic differences raise the natural question: What are the implications of adjustment costs 
for the voluminous body of research on corporate cash policy?  
 Previous studies of cash focused on the cross-sectional variation in cash holdings to 
discriminate between theories of corporate liquidity. Examples include Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson (1999), who estimate panel regressions explaining firm-level cash holdings and 
find that cash holdings are positively related to investment opportunities and cash flow volatility 
and negatively related to size, debt, and net working capital; Almeida, Campbello, and Weisbach 
(2004), who use panel regressions to show that cash is only positively related to cash flow when 
firms are financially constrained; and Faulkender and Wang (2006), who estimate cross-sectional 
regressions explaining the marginal value of cash and show that it declines with larger cash 
holdings, higher leverage, and higher bond ratings. However, our results emphasize a dynamic 
aspect of cash management, possibly correlated with previously documented cross-sectional 
determinants of cash, such as financing constraints, which might affect the interpretation of these 
cross-sectional determinants. In what follows, we test via simulations how costly adjustment of 
cash affects the interpretation of the results of cross-sectional estimations. 
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 This line of investigation builds on recent developments in the research on the costly 
adjustment of leverage. Leary and Roberts (2005), for example, show that the persistent effect of 
shocks on leverage is consistent with optimizing behavior in the presence of adjustment costs 
and is not necessarily due to firms' indifference toward capital structure. Strebulaev (2007) 
shows that cross-sectional patterns that commonly lead to the rejection of a dynamic tradeoff 
model of capital structure are actually consistent with such a model. In both papers, simulated 
capital structure paths that allow for costly adjustment are used to demonstrate the implications 
of adjustment costs.  
 This paper uses a similar approach. Specifically, we simulate corporate cash paths 
allowing for costly adjustment. Each firm is endowed at time 0 with the same target level of 
cash, Cash*, set equal to 15% of book assets. In each subsequent period, cash flows and capital 
expenditures arrive randomly. To keep the simulation as realistic as possible, we maintain the 
same universe of industry-firms observed empirically. Each firm in our empirical sample has a 
simulated counterpart in the same industry, with cash flows and capital expenditures generated 
randomly to match the distribution of cash flows and capital expenditures. Then, given the time-
series of cash flows and capital expenditures, we simulate cash paths. In our simulation, firms let 
their cash holdings fluctuate mechanically with cash flows and capital expenditures as long as 
cash holdings lie within an optimal range. Thus, as long as cash holdings lie within an optimal 
range, the cash holdings in period t+1 are given by: 
            (9) 
However, if the stream of cash flows and capital expenditures result in a cash ratio below the 
lower bound (above the upper bound) in period t, the firm calculates the amount of cash it needs 
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to accumulate (dispense) in order to bring the cash ratio to its target post-adjustment level. The 
rebalancing takes place in the beginning of period t+1, according to  
         (10) 
which takes into account the firm's expected cash flow and capital expenditure in period t+1. 
 We repeat this procedure for each firm in our sample, allowing for different degrees of 
speed of cash adjustment: 1) Cash interval of [0.14, 0.16] around the target, 0.15, representing 
low/no adjustment costs, 2) Cash interval of [0.10, 0.20] around the target, 0.15, representing 
medium adjustment costs, and 3) Cash interval of [0.05, 0.25] around the target, representing 
high adjustment costs.17 Given our previous findings that adjustment costs are asymmetrically 
higher when cash ratios lie below the target, we repeat the above tests with skewed adjustment 
bounds. Specifically, we let the cash intervals be wider below the target, and cut the distances 
between the target (of 0.15) and the upper bounds in (1)-(3) above by half.  
 We conjecture that firms with larger cash flow shocks, whose cash flows are therefore 
more volatile, will hold more cash in the presence of costly adjustment because costly 
adjustment keeps the firm from rebalancing. Similarly, firms with larger capital expenditure 
shocks, whose capital expenditures are more volatile, will hold less cash in the presence of costly 
adjustment. This will generate a mechanical relation between volatility in cash flow/capital 
expenditure and cash holdings that would not exist without adjustment costs. Without costly 
adjustment, firms' cash balances will frequently rebalance back to their target and therefore will 
not sustain a durable effect of cash flow/capital expenditure shocks.  
 Table 9 reports the simulation results and compares them with the results obtained using 
real-world data. The results are estimates from panel regressions explaining cash holdings. 
                                                 
17 Note that our choice of the maximal interval between the upper and lower bounds (0.25-0.05=0.20) is 
conservative. In our sample, the median firm-level interval between the maximum and minimum cash is 0.22.  
29 
 
Independent variables include cash flow, capital expenditure (CAPEX), cash flow volatility, and 
CAPEX volatility, and all regressions include time fixed-effects and cluster standard errors by 
firm. Panel A reports the results for the symmetric adjustment bounds, whereas Panel B reports 
them for the skewed bounds. Volatilities are measured at the Fama-French 48 industries level 
because previous cash literature measured cash flow volatility at the industry level to proxy for 
risk. The rationale for using industry-level volatility was to mitigate concerns about an 
endogenous/mechanical relation between firm-level cash holdings and firm-level cash flows. 
Thus, it is important to show that adjustment costs generate a mechanical relation between cash 
and industry-level volatility as well as cash and firm-level volatility. We present the results using 
industry-level volatility but note that the results are similar if we use firm-level volatility. 
 The results in Table 9 are striking and consistent with our hypotheses. In both panels, 
there is very little persistent shock effect to cash flow and capital expenditure without adjustment 
costs; and, therefore, the relation between cash ratios and the volatility in cash flow or in capital 
expenditure is very small. However, once the simulation allows for costly adjustment, the 
simulated data yields a substantial positive relation between cash flow volatility and cash and a 
substantial negative relation between capital expenditure volatility and cash. These effects are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level and are qualitatively similar to the relation between 
cash and cash flow volatility or cash and capital expenditure volatility that we observe in the 
real-world data. Moreover, the effects strengthen considerably when the speed of adjustment 
(SOA) is lower. In both panels, the magnitude of the volatility effect on cash increases 
substantially when the implied SOA decreases. Note that although the results are qualitatively 
similar with symmetric and skewed bounds, the effect of volatility is smaller with skewed 
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bounds. The reason is that skewed bounds imply faster speeds of adjustment, which in turn 
weaken the effect of adjustment costs on the relation between cash holdings and volatility. 
 The positive cross-sectional relation between cash and cash flow volatility is typically 
interpreted as consistent with the precautionary savings motive, which suggests that riskier firms 
should hold more cash. In contrast, our simulated result is purely mechanical. All simulated 
firms are assumed to have an identical target level of cash, which is unrelated to their cash flow 
volatility. Thus, the simulated positive relation between cash and cash flow volatility is a 
consequence of persistent cash flow shocks and infrequent rebalancing rather than a result of 
higher precautionary saving needs.  
 Further, we also find that both in real-world data and in simulations with costly 
adjustment, the volatility of capital expenditure is negatively related to cash. This result is 
surprising in the context of the precautionary savings theory, as higher volatility in expenditures 
(or investment) is predicted to imply higher cash reserves similar to the effect of higher cash 
flow volatility. To our knowledge, the negative relation between capital expenditure volatility 
and cash has not been previously shown. This relation is consistent with costly adjustment but 
inconsistent with the common view of precautionary savings.  
 Overall, these findings cast doubt on the interpretation of the standard results in the cash 
literature. The results suggest that cross-sectional relations between cash and cash flow volatility 
or capital expenditure volatility are not necessarily indicative of a precautionary saving motive 
and, in fact, might even be inconsistent with such a story. In contrast, our results show that these 
relations are consistent with, and mechanically driven by, adjustment costs. Furthermore, given 
that volatility is the primary driver of the aggregate increase in cash, documented by Bates, 




What are the time-series dynamics of cash holdings?  In this paper, we investigate this question 
by examining how firms manage cash reserves over time. We find evidence consistent with 
active, albeit imperfect, cash rebalancing due to costly adjustment. To show this, we estimate the 
speed of adjustment of the cash ratio to the target. In doing so, this paper is the first to apply the 
importance of costly adjustment to the cash literature.  Given the importance of adjustment costs 
in other financial policies (such as leverage and investment), it is only natural that these costs 
would also impact cash policy.   
Using a battery of estimation procedures and a wide range of cash ratio measures, we find 
that the rebalancing of cash is imperfect, with speeds of adjustment ranging from 0.22 to 0.43 
(where 0 implies perfect non-readjustment and 1 implies perfect adjustment). Slow rebalancing 
might be consistent with firms either not managing their cash to maintain a target ratio or 
imperfectly managing it due to adjustment costs. To distinguish between these two alternatives, 
we test whether firms actively manage cash ratios through financing, investment, and payout 
activities and find that such activities are indeed associated with higher speeds of adjustment. We 
then examine whether the patterns of cash rebalancing are consistent with the presence of 
adjustment costs and find that rebalancing is slower exactly when cost of adjustment is expected 
to be higher. We therefore conclude that firms do manage their cash ratios but do so imperfectly 
in the presence of adjustment costs. 
We also find that there is much cross-sectional variation in the speed of adjustment. We 
examine what factors influence a firm’s speed of adjustment. We find that firms with poorer 
corporate governance have slower adjustment. Interestingly, though, we find no correlation 
between the SOA of cash and the rebalancing of capital structure. 
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Given the impact of costly adjustment on cash policy, we then ask what the implications 
of adjustment costs are for the interpretation of previous results in the voluminous body of 
research on corporate cash policy. To do this, we simulate corporate cash data allowing for 
costly adjustment. We hypothesize that firms with greater cash flow (capital expenditure) 
volatility will hold more (less) cash in the presences of costly adjustment and that this will 
generate a mechanical relation between volatility and cash holdings. We find evidence to support 
this hypothesis: There is virtually no relation between cash holdings and cash flow/capital 
expenditure volatility when adjustment costs are low and a significant relation between them 
when adjustment costs are high.  Given that all simulated cash paths correspond to the same 
target cash level, regardless of cash flow/capital expenditure volatility, these findings cast doubt 
on the standard interpretation of the empirically observed relation between cash and volatility.  
The results therefore suggest that we might need to rethink our tests of cash holdings in the 
presence of costly adjustment.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
This appendix describes all variables used in this paper and presented in the following tables.  When we employ 
Compustat data, we provide the Compustat variable name in parentheses. 
 
Cash Variables: 
Cash is cash + short term investments (che).  
Cash to Net Book Assets is cash (che) divided by book assets (at) excluding cash (che).  
Cash-to-Book Assets  is cash (che) divided by book assets (at).  
Cash to Market Value is cash (che) divided by market value of assets, defined as book assets (at) minus book equity 
(ceq) plus market value of equity (csho*prcc) minus deferred taxes (txdb), following Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Target cash is estimated over a rolling 5-year window [t-5,t-1], and is defined as the predicted value from the 
empirical cash model Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), which includes lagged cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, 
Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital (excluding cash), R&D 
expenditures, and acquisitions. 
Unexpected Cash for Firm i is defined as the difference between its implied target cash ratio and its actual cash ratio. 
Active is an indicator variable that equals 1 if more than 50% of the change in unexpected cash from year t-1 to year t 
is due to the change in cash, and 0 if 50% of the change or more is due to the change in target cash.  
Positive unexpected cash is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm had positive unexpected cash at year t, and 
0 otherwise.  
Distance from target is the absolute value of unexpected cash. 
 
Estimates of Speeds of Adjustment of Cash (SOA) 
OLS procedure resembles the procedure to estimate target capital structure in Fama and French (2002) and Lemmon, 
Roberts, and Zender (2008), and is defined as follows (i denotes firm i and t denotes year t): 
1 · ·  
where:  is a vector of controls that corresponds to the empirical cash model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). 
FE procedure resembles the procedure in Flannery and Rangan (2006), and is defined as follows: 
1 · ·  
where:  are firm fixed effects 
GMM procedure is similar to the model in Blundell and Bond (1998), implemented by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 
(2008). 
LD (long differencing) estimator is similar to the one proposed by Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007) and 
implemented by Huang and Ritter (2009) using 2SLS: 





Other Accounting Variables: 
Cash Flow is measured as earnings less interest and taxes (ib+dp), divided by total assets (at).  
CAPEX is capital expenditure (capx) divided by total assets (at).  
STDebt and LTDebt are short-term debt (dlc) and long-term debt (dltt) divided by total assets (at), respectively.  
Payout is defined as the sum of dividend payments (dvp) and stock repurchases (prstkc), divided by book assets 
(at).  
Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (at).   
Net Equity Issues follows Baker and Wurgler (2002), and is defined as the difference between the change in book 
equity (at-lt-pstkr+txditc) and the change in retained earnings (re).  
Net Debt Issues is defined as difference between the change in book assets (at) and the change in book equity (at-lt-
pstkr+txditc).  
CF Volatility is the industry-level volatility in cash flows over the past 10 years.  
ROA is net income (oibdp) divided by book assets (at).  
Q is Tobin's Q, computed as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997), i.e., measured as the market value of assets, defined as 
book assets (at) minus book equity (ceq) plus market value of equity (csho*prcc) minus deferred taxes (txdb) 
divided by book assets (at). Outliers in Tobin’s Q are handled by bounding Q above at 10, following the alternative 
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Figure 1 
Average unexpected cash of unexpected cash portfolios in event time 
The sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing 
observations on cash for 15 years or more. The figure presents the average cash ratio of four portfolios in event time, 
where year zero is the portfolio formation period. That is, for each calendar year, we form four portfolios by ranking 
firms based on their unexpected cash (defined below). Holding the portfolios fixed for the next twenty years we 
compute the average unexpected cash for each portfolio. For example, in 1965 we sort firms into four groups based 
on the unexpected cash ratios. For each year from 1965 to 1984, we compute the average unexpected cash ratio for 
each of these four portfolios. We repeat this sorting in 1966 and averaging from 1976 to 1985 and so on for every 
year in our sample horizon. After performing this sorting and averaging for each year from 1965 to 2006, we then 
average the average unexpected cash across "event time" to obtain the lines in the figure. Unexpected cash is defined 
as the residuals from a cross-sectional regression of cash on the cross-sectional determinants of cash in Bates, Kahle, 
and Stulz (2009), which include lagged cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, 
a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital (excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions. Variable 




Average (detrended) stock repurchases of unexpected cash portfolios in event time 
The sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing 
observations on cash for 15 years or more. The figure presents the average stock repurchases to assets ratio of four 
portfolios in event time, where year zero is the portfolio formation period. That is, for each calendar year, we form 
four portfolios by ranking firms based on their unexpected cash (defined below). Holding the portfolios fixed for the 
next twenty years we compute the average stock repurchases to assets ratio for each portfolio. For example, in 1965 
we sort firms into four groups based on the unexpected cash ratios. For each year from 1965 to 1984, we compute 
the average stock repurchases to assets ratio for each of these four portfolios. We repeat this sorting in 1966 and 
averaging from 1976 to 1985 and so on for every year in our sample horizon. After performing this sorting and 
averaging for each year from 1965 to 2006, we then average the average stock repurchases to assets ratio across 
"event time" to obtain the lines in the figure. Unexpected cash is defined as the residuals from a cross-sectional 
regression of cash on the cross-sectional determinants of cash in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), which include 
lagged cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, 








Cash and Inflows vs. Outflows (Based on the Statement of Cash Flow) 
This figure presents mean statement-of-cash-flow estimates (as a percentage of book assets) for subsamples sorted on 
lagged cash ratios. Low cash (high cash) is an indicator that equals 1 if the company's lagged cash ratio is lower (higher) 
than the sample-wide previous years' median cash ratio. The sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual 



















The Cross-Sectional Distribution of Firm-Level Speed of Adjustment (SOA) of Cash 
This Figure presents a histogram of the cross-sectional distribution of firm-level SOA of cash. The SOA is estimated 
from the following target model estimated by firm: 
∆ , ·  
where: ∆ , and the optimal cash is the predicted value from the empirical cash model in 
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), estimated over a rolling 5-year window [t-5,t-1], which includes lagged cash flow, 
industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital 
(excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The 
sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations 







This table presents summary statistics for the sample, which consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files 
from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations on cash for 15 years or more. Cash flow is measured as earnings less 
interest and taxes, divided by total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditure divided by total assets. STDebt and LTDebt are 
short-term debt and long-term debt divided by total assets, respectively. Payout is defined as the sum of dividend 
payments and stock repurchases, divided by book assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
NWC is net working capital excluding cash, divided by book assets. R&D is research and development expense, divided 
by total assets, where missing value are set to zero. Acquisitions is acquisition expense, divided by total assets. Net equity 
issues follows Baker and Wurgler (2002), and is defined as the difference between the change in book equity and the 
change in retained earnings. Net debt issues is defined as difference between the change in book assets and the change in 
book equity. Deficit is the difference between the change in book assets and the change in retained earnings. CF volatility 
is the industry-level volatility in cash flows over the past 10 years. ROA is net income divided by book assets. Q is 
Tobin's Q, computed as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997), i.e., measured as the book value of total assets minus book value 
of equity plus market value of equity divided by total assets. Outliers in Tobin’s Q are handled by bounding Q above at 
10, following the alternative measure of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003). 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. n_obs 
CF 0.080 0.090 0.104 105,921 
CAPEX 0.072 0.055 0.065 106,091 
STDebt 0.060 0.028 0.087 105,846 
LTDebt 0.204 0.178 0.177 106,091 
Payout 0.024 0.013 0.038 106,091 
Size 5.692 5.466 1.798 106,091 
NWC 0.146 0.140 0.187 102,556 
R&D expenses 0.019 0.000 0.046 106,091 
Acquisitions 0.014 0.000 0.046 106,091 
Net debt issues 0.025 0.020 0.155 68,979 
Net equity issues 0.029 0.006 0.105 68,180 
CF volatility 0.049 0.043 0.027 106,091 
ROA 0.135 0.138 0.107 105,526 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 
Table 3 
Estimates of Speed of Adjustment (SOA) of Cash 
This table presents estimates from different estimation procedures of the speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash for 
different measures of cash (defined in Table 2). The OLS procedure resembles the procedure to estimate target capital 
structure in Fama and French (2002) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), and is defined as follows ( i denotes 
firm i and t denotes year t): 
1 · ·  
where:  is a vector of control variables following the model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), which includes 
lagged cash flow, cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, dividend payout dummy, size, net working 
capital excluding cash, R&D expenditure, and acquisition expenditure.  
The fixed-effects (FE) procedure resembles the procedure in Flannery and Rangan (2006), and is defined as follows: 
1 · ·  
The GMM procedure is similar to the model in Blundell and Bond (1998), implemented by Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008). 
The long differencing (LD) estimator is similar to the one proposed by Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007) and 
implemented by Huang and Ritter (2009) using 2SLS: 
, , 1 ·  
The active adjustment estimator follows Faulkender et al. (2010) and re-estimates a modified version of the above 
regressions, where the lagged independent cash variables are scaled by the sum of lagged book assets and current net 
income (NI), i.e.,:   . 
In all cases, the table reports the SOA, given above by . Significance levels for 1  are indicated as follows: * = 
10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.  
 




0.220*** 0.393*** 0.353*** 0.338*** 
[0.004] [0.005] [0.012] [0.003] 
Observations 86,933 86,933 86,933 70,810 




0.246*** 0.431*** 0.429*** 0.347*** 
[0.012] [0.017] [0.029] [0.003] 
Observations 86,933 86,933 86,933 70,810 





0.248*** 0.418*** 0.421*** 0.356*** 
[0.005] [0.007] [0.012] [0.003] 
Observations 86,527 86,527 86,527 59,851 





0.230*** 0.440*** 0.433*** 0.355*** 
[0.005] [0.007] [0.012] [0.003] 
Observations 86,844 86,844 86,844 70,632 




Active Rebalancing of Cash Ratios 
This table presents estimates of the speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash for subsamples sorted on Active, which is an indicator that 
equals 1 if more than 50% of the change in unexpected cash from year t-1 to year t is due to the change in cash, and 0 if 50% of the 
change or more is due to the change in target cash (Panel A), below- versus above-median investment, as measured by capital 
expenditures (panel B), and large net issues of debt and equity of more than 5% of book assets (panel C). The SOA is estimated as 
follows (i denotes firm i and t denotes year t): 
1 · ·  
where:  is a vector of control variables following the model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), which includes lagged cash 
flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital 
(excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Target cash is the 
predicted value from the empirical model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), estimated over a rolling 5-year window [t-5,t-1], and 
unexpected cash is the difference between the firm's actual cash and its implied target cash ratio. The sample consists of all 
industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations on cash for 15 years or more. 
Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
Panel A: SOA & Active Adjustment 
  Cash/ book assets Cash/net book assets Cash/market value of assets 
  Passive Active Passive Active Passive Active 
SOA 
0.042*** 0.361*** 0.017*** 0.395*** 0.047*** 0.417*** 
[0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.015] [0.002] [0.006] 
R-squared 0.966 0.681 0.979 0.618 0.946 0.566 
N obs 36,058 44,776 47,242 33,592 33,600 47,234 
Panel B: Investment 
  Cash/ book assets Cash/net book assets Cash/market value of assets 
  Low High Low High Low High 
SOA 
0.228*** 0.314*** 0.214*** 0.401*** 0.286*** 0.359*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.019] [0.007] [0.007] 
R-squared 0.779 0.719 0.724 0.677 0.658 0.602 
N obs 43,952 44,933 43,952 44,933 42,839 43,649 
Panel C: Large Net Debt and Equity Issues (> 5% of Firm Assets) 
  Cash/ book assets Cash/net book assets Cash/market value of assets 
  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
SOA 
0.196*** 0.328*** 0.203*** 0.310*** 0.234*** 0.441*** 
[0.005] [0.007] [0.015] [0.019] [0.006] [0.010] 
R-squared 0.796 0.737 0.734 0.690 0.708 0.548 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Speed of Adjustment and Free Cash Flow 
This table presents estimates of the speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash for subsamples sorted on free cash flow (FCF). 
The low (high) FCF bin consists of the bottom (top) 15% of firms in terms of FCF, while the medium bin consist of the 
remaining 70%. The SOA is estimated as follows (i denotes firm i and t denotes year t): 
1 · ·  
where:  is a vector of control variables following the model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), which includes 
lagged cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net 
working capital (excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. The sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing 
observations on cash for 15 years or more. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
Panel A: Cash/ book assets 
  Free Cash Flow 
  Low Medium  High 
SOA 
0.270*** 0.191*** 0.231*** 
[0.009] [0.005] [0.011] 
R-squared 0.766 0.721 0.692 
N obs 12,744 60,245 12,716 
Panel B: Cash/net book assets 
  Free Cash Flow 
  Low Medium  High 
SOA 
0.283*** 0.213*** 0.277*** 
[0.017] [0.020] [0.042] 
R-squared 0.733 0.643 0.658 
N obs 12,744 60,245 12,716 
Panel C: Cash/market value of assets 
  Free Cash Flow 
  Low Medium  High 
SOA 
0.306*** 0.217*** 0.321*** 
[0.012] [0.006] [0.019] 
R-squared 0.566 0.639 0.481 






The Speed of Adjustment and Corporate Governance 
This table presents estimates of the speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash for subsamples sorted on various measures of corporate 
governance. The SOA is estimated as follows (i denotes firm i and t denotes year t): 
1 · ·  
where:  is a vector of control variables following the model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), which includes lagged cash 
flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital 
(excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. In panel A, corporate 
governance is measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index, which measures the number of 
antitakeover provisions in a firm’s charter and in the legal code of the state in which the firm is incorporated. In panel B, 
governance is measured by the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, whereas in Panel C it is measured by the sum 
of all ownership positions greater than 5% held by institutional investors. For each of these measures, we divide the sample 
around the median, and code the corresponding halves as poor governance and good governance. The sample consists of all 
industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations on cash for 15 years or more. 
Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
Panel A:GIM Index 
  Cash/ book assets Cash/net book assets Cash/market value of assets 
  Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good 
SOA 
0.202*** 0.240*** 0.244*** 0.217*** 0.273*** 0.293*** 
[0.009] [0.013] [0.031] [0.026] [0.015] [0.022] 
R-squared 0.838 0.783 0.728 0.753 0.713 0.674 
N obs 8,616 7,187 8,616 7,187 8,609 7,179 
Panel B:% Shares Owned by Institutional Investors 
  Cash/ book assets Cash/net book assets Cash/market value of assets 
  Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good 
SOA 
0.230*** 0.278*** 0.250*** 0.258*** 0.298*** 0.310*** 
[0.006] [0.005] [0.018] [0.016] [0.009] [0.006] 
R-squared 0.803 0.719 0.728 0.683 0.686 0.620 
N obs 26,968 61,917 26,968 61,917 26,647 59,841 
Panel C: Block Holders (5% or More of Shares) 
  Cash/ book assets Cash/net book assets Cash/market value of assets 
  Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good 
SOA 
0.230*** 0.281*** 0.253*** 0.256*** 0.297*** 0.311*** 
[0.006] [0.005] [0.017] [0.017] [0.008] [0.006] 
R-squared 0.805 0.713 0.729 0.678 0.686 0.618 




The Speed of Adjustment of Cash and Debt 
This table compares estimates of the speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash and debt. The SOA of cash is estimated as follows (i 
denotes firm i and t denotes year t): 
1 · ·  
where:  is a vector of control variables following the model in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009 which includes lagged cash 
flow, industry cash flow volatility, Tobin's Q, capital expenditure, debt, a dividend dummy, firm size, net working capital 
(excluding cash), R&D expenditures, and acquisitions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.  
The SOA of debt is estimated using the empirical model of debt in Byoun (2008) as follows: 
_ _ _ _
_ _ _   
The sample consists of all industrial firms in Compustat's annual files from 1965 to 2006, with non-missing observations on 
cash for 15 years or more. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 















0.258*** 0.254*** 0.245*** 0.256*** 0.301*** 0.306*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.018] [0.016] [0.007] [0.007] 
R-squared 0.745 0.767 0.699 0.712 0.643 0.644 





This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining firm-level annual cash holdings. In both panels, 
Column 1 reports regression results for Compustat annual data from 1965 to 2006. Columns 2-4 report regression 
results for simulated cash paths corresponding to the empirical universe of Compustat firms, where cash flows and 
capital expenditures are randomly generated to match the joint empirical distribution of cash flows and capital 
expenditures observed in the data. At time 0, firms are endowed with cash holdings equal to 15% book assets. In each 
subsequent period, cash holdings change according to the difference between cash flows and capital expenditures that 
arrive in that period, unless the cash ratio reaches the lower or upper bound, in which case it is rebalanced to the target 
ratio of 15%, taking into account the expected cash flows and capital expenditures in the next period. We repeat this 
procedure for each firm in our sample, allowing for different degrees of speed of cash adjustment, as implied by the 
adjustment bounds. In Panel A, adjustment bounds are symmetric around the target, whereas in Panel B they are 
skewed to reflect our finding that adjustment costs are lower above the target. Specifically, in Panel A the bounds are 
as follows: 1) Low adjustment costs - Cash interval of [14%, 16%], 2) Medium adjustment costs - Cash interval of 
[10%, 20%], 3) High adjustment costs - Cash interval of [5%, 25%]. In Panel B, the interval above the 15% target is 
cut by half, representing faster adjustment above the target. The implied speed of adjustment (SOA) is given at the 
bottom of each column. All regressions include year fixed effects. Standard errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity 
consistent and clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are indicated: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 














Cash flow volatility 
2.217*** 0.006*** 0.053*** 0.113*** 
[0.105] [0.001] [0.011] [0.029] 
CAPEX volatility 
-0.468*** -0.003*** -0.343*** -0.958*** 
[0.092] [0.001] [0.021] [0.055] 
R-squared 0.114 0.999 0.894 0.72 
N Obs 104,364 155,918 155,918 155,918 
Implied SOA 0.153 0.871 0.588 0.447 














Cash flow volatility 
2.217*** 0.010*** 0.042*** 0.051*** 
[0.105] [0.001] [0.007] [0.020] 
CAPEX volatility 
-0.468*** -0.006*** -0.199*** -0.664*** 
[0.092] [0.001] [0.014] [0.037] 
R-squared 0.114 0.998 0.939 0.805 
N Obs 104,364 155,918 155,918 155,918 
Implied SOA 0.153 0.918 0.611 0.512 
 
